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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
William Jack Bias timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction,
challenging its order denying Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of substitute
counsel.

Mr. Bias argues that the district court erred when it failed to inquire into

Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of new counsel.

Mr. Bias also argues that the

district court erred when it failed to appoint substitute counsel because trial counsel was
representing Mr. Bias under an actual conflict of interest. Mr. Bias also argues that his
sentence is excessively harsh.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Police pulled over Mr. Bias after observing his car "drifting in its lane."
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)
alcohol and noticed an open container of whiskey.

The officer could smell

(PSI, p.3.)

Mr. Bias' seventeen

year-old son was in the back seat of the car and admitted that he drank some of his
father's whiskey. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Mr. Bias was eventually arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI). (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Bias was charged, by information, with a misdemeanor charge of injury to a
child, and a DUI with a felony enhancement.

(R., pp.36-37.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Bias pleaded guilty to a felony DUI and, in return, the State dismissed
the remaining charge. (R., pp.45-46, 50; 02/11/13 Tr., p.1, L.20 - p.2, L.B.) Thereafter,
the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed.
(R., pp.50-51.) Mr. Bias timely appealed. (R., pp.55-57.)
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In the meantime, trial counsel filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule
35) motion requesting leniency. (R., pp.53-53.) Mr. Bias then field a pro se motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, a pro se motion requesting appointment of counsel, and a pro
se motion to transport in order to "be present for [h]earing.,,1

Mr. Bias supported his

request for the appointment of new counsel with the claim that his relationship with his
current counsel had become irreparably damaged, due to the claims raised in his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Motion for the Appointment of Counsel
(Augmentation), pp.1-2.)
A hearing was held on these motions. (see generally 06/24/13 Tr.)

However,

Mr. Bias was not present for the hearing despite his motion for transport.

(06/24/13

Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13; Motion for Order to Transport (Augmentation), pp.1-2.)
At the hearing, trial counsel indicated that the pro se motions might be, in
substance, a petition for post-conviction relief because the claims made in support of
the motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea appeared to be based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. (06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25; Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
and Supporting Information (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) The district court then stated it
was also unsure about the nature of the pro se motions. (06/24/13 Tr., p.18, L.15 p.19, L.17, p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.25.) Specifically, the district court was unsure if the
request for the appointment of counsel was in substance either a request for substitute
counsel in relation to the Rule 35 motion or a request for the appointment for counsel to
represent Mr. Bias in post-conviction proceedings.

(06/24/13 Tr., p.18, L.15 - p.19,

L.17, p.20, L.18 - p.21, L.25.) Both trial counsel and the district court appeared to agree

1 The materials related to theses motions are currently not in the record on appeal.
Accordingly, a motion to augment the record on appeal has been filed concurrently with
this brief.
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that the motion for the appointment of counsel was a request for "new" counsel.
(06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.22-25, 18, L.15 - p.19, L.17.) In order to resolve this confusion,
the district court decided to deny the Rule 35 motion without prejudice, which the district
court thought would allow Mr. Bias to file another Rule 35 motion, in the event the
district court determined that it would grant the motion for the appointment of counsel.
(06/24/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.7-17, p.20, Ls.18-21.) The district court then denied all of the
remaining motions without prejudice. (06/24/13 Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.22, L.11.)
After the hearing, the district court entered a written order denying all of the
pending motions with prejudice, but did not rule on the merits of any specific claims
relating to the adequacy of trial counsel's performance. 2 (Order Denying All Pending
Motions (Augmentation), pp.1-2.)

Mr. Bias is not challenging the denial of either his motion to withdraw his guilty plea or
his Rule 35 motion on appeal.

2
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for the appointment of
new counsel to represent him in regard to his Rule 35 motion and his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Bias following his plea of guilty to a
felony DUI?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bias' Motion For The Appointment Of New
Counsel To Represent Him In Regard To His Rule 35 Motion And His Motion to
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Mr. Bias requested the appointment of counsel because he had made claims

against his trial counsel in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. When a
district court becomes aware of an actual conflict of interest between trial counsel and a
defendant, the district court must appoint substitute counsel. Moreover, when a
defendant requests the appointment of new counsel, generally, a duty is triggered and
the district court must afford the defendant an opportunity to explain the basis for the
request.

Mr. Bias argues, based on both his constitutional right to counsel and his

statutory right to counsel, that both of these duties were triggered when he filed his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his motion requesting the appointment of counsel,
and that the district court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Constitutional issues and the construction and application of legislative acts are

pure questions of law over which [Idaho appellate courts exercise] free review. State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 136 (2001). To determine if the court conducted an adequate
inquiry into reasons why substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a
person wishes to reject the court appointed counsel and self-represent, should be
reviewed de novo. See State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 1997). Additionally, the
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adequacy of a district court's inquiry into a conflict of interests is a question of law over
which Idaho appellate courts exercise free review. Statton, 136 Idaho at 136.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Appointment Substitute Counsel As
An Actual Conflict of interest Existed
Mr. Bias' pro se motions created an actual conflict of interest which required the

district court to appoint conflict counsel.

Every defendant has the right to be

represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73 (1981).
Mr. Bias has a Sixth Amendment a right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal
process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 523. Additionally,
the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a statutory right to counsel which carries with it
the correlative right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Hall, _

P.3d _ , 2013

WL 6225673, at *4 (2013);3 see also Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 687. A right to effective
assistance of counsel carries with it the right to conflict free counsel.

Cuyler v. Sullivan,

446 U.S. 335, 348-349 (1980). When an actual conflict exists and a district court fails to
grant a request for the appointment of conflict counsel, reversal is mandatory. Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 348-349.
An actual conflict of interest existed in this matter. Mr. Bias' motion to withdraw
his guilty plea contained allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and his motion
for the appointment of counsel alleged that his relationship with trial counsel was
irreparably damaged due to his claims that trial counsel was ineffective in regard to the
entry of his plea. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Supporting Information
(Augmentation), pp.1-2); (Motion for the Appointment of Counsel (Augmentation), pp.1-

3 The Hall Opinion analyzed the right to conflict free counsel during post-conviction
proceedings after the imposition of the death penalty.
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2.) At the hearing on Mr. Bias' pending motions, trial counsel stated that he thought that
Mr. Bias' pro se motions were in substance as "a petition for post-conviction relief."
(06/24/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.22.) The district court was also uncertain about the
nature of Mr. Bias' pro se motion, and expressed its confusion as follows:
As far as the pending Motions, the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty
Plea, Rule 33 states pretty clearly that you can't bring a Motion to
Withdraw a Guilty plea after sentencing except [when] there's a manifest
injustice. In reviewing the Motion that was filed essentially the issues
being raised there appear to be ineffective assistance of counsel-type
issues and typically those type of issues are resolved via post-conviction
relief.
The Defendant asking for the Court to appoint new counsel for him
while his case is under appeal, under the circumstances I don't think the
Court should appoint new counsel at this time. In essence, he's trying to
get new counsel to handle Rule 35 -- excuse me, post-conviction relief.
(06/24/13 Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21.)

However, the district court also indicated that it also

considered the request for the appointment of counsel a request for new counsel to
represent him in regard to the Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (06/24/13 Tr., p.19,
Ls.7-17.)
Based on the foregoing facts, the district court erred when it failed to grant his
motion for the appointment of new counsel because the claims Mr. Bias made against
trial counsel in the motion to withdraw his guilty plea created an actual conflict of
interest as trial counsel had a personal interest in seeing those claims denied. The fact
that the district court thought that the motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea was
potentially, in substance, a petition under the Uniform Post-Convict Procedures Act
claiming that trial counsel was ineffective only exacerbates the nature of this conflict. 4

The district court could not treat Mr. Bais' motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a
petition for post-conviction because it was filed in this case. See State v. Allen, 153
Idaho 367 (Ct. App. 2012).

4
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As such, trial counsel was in an adversarial relationship with Mr. Bias in regard to the
motion to withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea at the June 24, 2013 hearing, and the district
court should have granted the motion for the appointment of new counsel and continued
the hearing.

However, the district court required trial counsel to continue his

representation of Mr. Bias in regard to both the Rule 35 motion and the motion to
withdraw Mr. Bias' guilty plea.

This is reversible error and this case should be

remanded with instructions to allow Mr. Bias to be appointed substitute trial counsel and
the opportunity for rehearing on the Rule 35 motion and the motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
In sum, the district court erred in requiring trial counsel to continue representing
Mr. Bias while operating under an actual conflict of interest.

D.

The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Mr. Bias' Request For Substitute
Counsel
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13

of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical
stages of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion." State v. Wade,
125 Idaho 522,523 (Ct. App. 1994).5
In addition to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, I.C. § 19-852 also provides
criminal defendants a statutory right to counsel which extends to Rule 35 proceedings.

5 The plain language of Wade notwithstanding, in State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454,
458 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals cited to Wade for the proposition that a
criminal defendant only has a statutory right to an attorney during Rule 35 proceedings.
Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 458 n.2. The Court of Appeals also held that "a post-judgment
hearing upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 458.
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State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454,458 n.2 (Ct. App. 2010). A statutory right to counsel

carries with it the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 (1995) ("We can see no legitimate
basis for determining whether there has been a violation of the right to effective of
counsel guaranteed by I.C. § 19-852 differently from determining whether there has
been a violation of a similar constitutional right.").
"It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed counsel includes the
right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily include the right to an
attorney of one's own choice." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995). While a
criminal defendant does not have the right to counsel of his/her choice, however, "for
'good cause' a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an
indigent defendant." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594.
Good cause can be established if there is a total breakdown in attorney client
communications. State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 285 (2013). In the event a defendant
claims that there has been a total breakdown in attorney-client communications, a duty
is triggered requiring the district court to inquire into the defendant's basis for that claim.
Id. The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the

facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel. Id. In fact, this
must occur even if the district court has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay
and manipulative tactics," as there can be "no substitute for the inquires necessary to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights." Peck, 130 Idaho at 714.
While a district court must afford a defendant a full and fair opportunity to present
facts to support the request for the appointment of counsel, the duty to inquire does not
impose an onerous burden on the court. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court found
9

that this duty to inquire was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make
any statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel.

State v.

Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980). Conversely, in Peck, supra, this duty to inquire

was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address the court concerning
his desire for substitute trial counsel. Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14.

In coming to that

conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
As [Mr. Peck] points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance.
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation
by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily
rejecting [Mr. Peck's] request, as the district court appears to have done.
Id. at 714. As stated above, the duty to inquire imposes a minimal burden on a district

court.

Once a defendant has requested the appointment of substitute counsel the

district court must provide a defendant the opportunity to explain the reasons for the
request, even if the district court has "well founded suspicions" that the request is
merely a means to manipulate the court. Id.
In this case, Mr. Bias filed a motion for the appointment of counsel alleging that
his relationship with trial counsel was irreparably damaged due to his claims that trial
counsel was ineffective in regard to the entry of his plea. (Motion for the Appointment of
Counsel (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) Mr. Bias argues that this request triggered the district
court's mandatory duty to inquire into Mr. Bias' request for substitute counsel. Instead
of asking Mr. Bias why he wanted new counsel, the district court did not even allow
Mr. Bias to appear at the hearing on his motion (06/24/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-13), even
though Mr. Bias filed a motion for transport to be present for any hearings on the
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pending motions. 6

(Motion for Order to Transport (Augmentation), pp.1-2.)

All the

district court needed to do was allow Mr. Bias to appear at that hearing telephonically
and provide him an opportunity to explain the basis for his motion requesting substitute
counsel.

This error is amplified because the district court and trial counsel both

recognized Mr. Bias' motion was for "new counsel," but were unsure if it was in regard
to the remaining motions in the criminal case or if it was a request for counsel to
represent him in proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act.

(06/24/13 Tr .. p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.7, p.18, L.15 - p.19, L.17, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.19.) As
such, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Bias' motion for the appointment of new
counsel.
As a final note, the district court ultimately denied Mr. Bias' request for the
appointment of counsel on the basis that it had already appointed appellate counsel.
(Order Denying All Pending Motions (Augmentation), pp.1-2.) This rationale is flawed,
as the State Appellate Public Defender's Office can only represent non-capital felony
defendants for purposes of appellate proceedings. I.C. § 19-870. In fact, the district
court's Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender states that the "State
Appellate Public Defender's Office shall represent [Mr. Bias] for this appeal." (R., p.58.)
As such, there is no authority which would enable his appellate counsel to appear
before the district court and represent him as trial counselor as his conflict trial counsel.
Therefore, the mere fact that appellate counsel had been appointed did not cure the
district court's failure to inquire into Mr. Bias' request for the appointment of substitute
trial counsel.

At a minimum, the district court could have allowed Mr. Bias to appear at the hearing
telephonically.

6
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In sum, the district court erred when it did not afford Mr. Bias the opportunity to
explain why he wanted the appointment of new counsel.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten
Years, With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Bias Following His Plea Of Guilty To A Felony
DUI
Mr. Bias asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten
years, with five years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Bias does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Bias must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that Mr. Bias'
sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, the nature of the offense is a mitigating
factor. Mr. Bias' brother committed suicide and, a few days later, Mr. Bias decided to
12

take a nostalgic drive to Ashton, Idaho where is brother was living at the time of his
death. (PSI, pp.4, 14.) While in Aston, Mr. Bias decided to go to bar which was owned
by his brother's former mother-in-law. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Bias then made the poor decision
to drive home.

(PSI, p.4.) While this is no excuse for his behavior, it does put his

decision to drink and drive into context, as Mr. Bias was not thinking clearly due to the
obvious grief caused by his brother's death.
Additionally, Mr. Bias' difficult childhood is a mitigating factor. Mr. Bias' parents
had a rocky relationship and separated many times until they finally divorced when he
was six years old.

(PSI, p.14.)

Mr. Bias was exposed to instability, abuse, and

alcoholism as a young child. (PSI, p.22.) When he was nineteen, Mr. Bias was drinking
and was involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of his friend.

(Idaho

Standard Mental Health Assessment Attached to the PSI, p.?) Mr. Bias' father also
committed suicide when Mr. Bias was only eight years old.

(PSI, p.14.)

Mr. Bias

grandfather also committed suicide. (PSI, p.1B.) The fact that Mr. Bias' grandfather,
and father committed suicide must amplified the pain Mr. Bias suffered as he learned
about his brother's suicide, opening deep psychological wounds Mr. Bias suffered as a
young child.
Mr. Bias is a father of four children and before he was arrested for the instant
offense he provided financial support for three of his children, as his oldest is an adult.
(PSI, p.16.) At the time of the presentence investigation, Mr. Bias did not owe any child
support. (PSI, p.16.)
Mr. Bias has a history of mental health issues.
depression since he was a teenager.

Mr. Bias has suffered from

(Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment

Attached to the PSI, p.?) Mr. Bias depression intensified after his bother committed
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suicide and Mr. Bias has "ongoing suicidal ideations" as a result.
Mental Health Assessment Attached to the PSI, p.7.)
symptoms associated with PTSD.

(Idaho Standard

Mr. Bias also described

(Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment

Attached to the PSI, p.7.)
Mr. Bias earned his GED and HSE. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Bias also has a relatively
strong employment background and was making thirty five dollars an hour at his last
job. (PSI, pp.17-18.) Mr. Bias indicated that he had never been fired. (PSI, p.17.)
The PSI investigator also noted that Mr. Bias "appears to be truly remorseful for
his actions in the instant offense, and [his] prior offenses. (PSI, p.22.) Mr. Bias also
"fully understands the impact that his actions have had, and could have, on himself and
others." (PSI, p.22.) He also "appears to be sincere in his desire to obtain treatment for
both his alcohol addiction .... " (PSI, p.22.)
In sum, Mr. Bias' sentence is excessively harsh when it is viewed in light of the
mitigating factors present in this matter.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further
proceedings and instructions to appoint substitute counsel.

Alternatively, Mr. Bias

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further proceedings and
instructions to conduct the appropriate inquiries regarding Mr. Bias' request for
substitute counsel. Alternatively, Mr. Bias respectfully requests that this Court reduce
the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 9th day of January, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
14

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of January, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
WILLIAM BIAS
INMATE #51715
SICI
PO BOX 8509
BOISE 10 83707
GREGORY W MOELLER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
R JAMES ARCHIBALD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE 1083720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SFW/eas

15

